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THE EFFECTS OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSAATION STRUCTURE
ON SHAREHOLDER WEALTH AND COMPANY PERFORMANCE
Km:y Blumer and Michael Seeborg*
Department of Economics, Illinois Wesleyan University

Corporate executives are paid at extremely high levels compared to lower-level
employees, especially in the United States, and their level of compensation usually does
not change based on company performance with respect to competitors, but rather with
changes in their company's stock price. It is well known that executive compensation
among U.S. corporations is comprised mostly of stock options, sometimes up to 90% of
overall compensation (EDGAR 2003). These stock options allow executives, namely
chief executive officers (CEOs), to cash in big bucks during good times and risk zero
losses during bad times. I use principal-agent theory and past literature to hypothesize
the pattern of changes in shareholder wealth, and in reported earnings, from 1993-2001
for 20 U.S. "blue chip" companies. Using simple linear regression analysis, I find that
differences in CEO compensation structure have no significant effects on shareholder
wealth and reported earnings. I also find that companies whose CEOs sell an unusually
high value of stock options suffer a significant decline in shareholder value in the
following year. Policy implications, based on my findings and other literature, are also
discussed.

